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ABSTRACT

In a backdrop of rising nationalism and far-right populism, the position of
refugees and asylum seekers in the European Union (EU) since the 2015 immigration
crisis has been placed under stress in both policy and practice. The identity of many of
these recent immigrants as Muslim has further compounded the barriers faced in the
immigration process as religiously motivated forms of marginalization through policy,
practice, and rhetoric have been increasing in salience. This context allowed for the
research question driving this thesis to develop as: How does the relationship between
immigration and religion shape the experience for Muslims asylum seekers in France and
Hungary? Policy analysis and its implementation will be the central focus of this paper.
The mainstream quality of Islamophobia is contributed to in France and Hungary,
as well as across the rest of the EU, by the presence of far-right populist parties which
stake their political motivations in highly exclusionary nativism which most frequently
targets foreign-born populations. Though the populist leaders and groups in France and
Hungary are not the causation of xenophobic sentiments, their existence has catalyzed the
integration of radical right politics into the regular sociopolitical climate in the EU. Thus,
the correlations examined in this paper are between the immigration and religious
polices, practices, and sentiments in both France and Hungary as related to their citizens,
Muslim immigrant groups, the EU system, and populism. The analysis and research
findings are rooted in literature review of primary and secondary sources as well as
quantitative data and value sets. Ultimately, this paper argues that the EU has been weak
in implementing and enforcing immigration policy.
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INTRODUCTION

Spring of 2019 marks the eighth year of the ongoing Syrian Civil War which
commenced as part of the Arab Spring socio-political revolutions in 2011.1 This violent
conflict in Syria caused the formation of one of the largest humanitarian crises of this
decade, with nearly 6 million people fleeing the nation as refugees, and an additional 6.6
million left internally displaced (UNHCR, Government of Turkey, 2019). The
immigration of refugees and asylum seekers from not only Syria, but also Afghanistan,
Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria, and more (Migration Policy Institute, 2018) to the EU reached its
peak in 2015, with 1.3 million people seeking asylum applications (Eurostat, 2019). This
arrival influx of third-country nationals and stateless persons on the EU’s external
borders created policy stress, inter-EU tensions, and a feeling of crisis among many
citizens. Due to the majority of these immigrants’ identity as Muslim, religion and
ethnicity become direct sources for anti-immigration groups to attack. The refugee crisis
since 2015 has played key role in catalyzing both pro and anti-immigration sects of EU
member-states, with pressures on immigration policies at all levels becoming one of the
most important socio-political movements of the past five years.
The EU’s governmental, legal, and institutional structures bore massive stress as
citizens and states both conformed to or rejected policy plans to cope with the large
influxes of refugees. In particular, the immigration policies of the EU became
increasingly less popular as member states began to demonstrate their preference for

1

For further reading on the Arab Spring, please see sources: Tinnes, J. (2013). Literature on the Arab
Spring. Perspectives on Terrorism, 7(5), 155-185. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/stable/26297053

1

domestically set systems of immigration rights. Though the EU has managed to maintain
their top-down control of member states through this immigration crisis, key events such
as Brexit and multiple refugee quota rejections, rooted in the distaste for the EU level
policies, have highlighted the weaknesses of the EU in its ability to have complete
enforceable control over its immigration policy.
While the party which controls France, la République en Marche, of current
President Emanuel Macron, is centrist and pro-immigration, the main opposition party is
from the far right, Le Rassemblement National, the National Rally. This is the political
platform of prominent populist leader Marine Le Pen. Though Marine Le Pen has since
renamed this famous populist political party of her father Jean-Marie Le Pen from the
Front National to the RN, the messages and practices differ only slightly in order to
distance herself and the party from its anti-Semitic roots. Anti-Immigration policy reform
remains the key rallying point of the RN, stemming from the nationalism and
Islmophobia which the RN has been propagandizing on since the time of Marine’s father
(Kuru, 2008, p.13). For France, which has taken in an increasing number of asylum
applicants since 2015 (Eurostat, 2019), the emergency response plans and reallocation
schemes installed by the EU have been essential to the implementation of effective
immigration, yet prominent Islamophobic sentiments have continued to rise in political
attention and support. Compounded upon by the strong anti-immigration oppositional
factions, the historically troubled relationship between church and state in France has
furthered the tensions with which the highly secular nation viewed and reacted to its
increasingly large Muslim populations.2 Though Islam has been in France for hundreds of

2

See chapter 13 for further discussion of the history of church and state in France: Troper, M. (2016).
Republicanism and Freedom of Religion in France. In Barkey, K. & Cohen J. & Laborde C. (Eds.),

2

years, the outwardly more recognizable religious and cultural signals of dress deepened
laïcité secularist tensions between these immigrants and the national Christian
population. French ultra-secularists view Muslims as incompatible with their way of life.
The Rassemblement National took hold of this tension and increased the salience of antiimmigration policy preferences via a nativist stance which targets Muslims.
Like many other EU states, Hungary experienced increased rates of immigrant
arrivals to their direct external borders, as the nation is at the head of the Western Balkan
Migration route for immigrants moving over land out of the Middle East. However,
Hungarian political reactions to immigration waves took a more exclusive and
controversial turn than those in France, with highly restrictive policies and refugee
refusals becoming the norm. Far-right populist party Fidesz – Magyar Polgári
Szövestség, Fidesz- Hungarian Civic Alliance, is the main proponent of anti-immigration
policies in Hungary. This party is led by Viktor Orbán who, with his consistent position
as Prime Minister since 2010, has directly aided in fostering the sociopolitical climate
that favors the rights of the native Christian Hungarian citizen over all other groups,
relying on the propagandized spreading of both nativist and Islamophbic sentiments and
policy practices, even before the 2015 refugee influxes.
The uses of Christianity as a majority practice, secularly unifying system, and
nationalist ideal by Orbán reflects a patterned historical use of Christian church groups as
resistance strongholds against exterior forces in Hungary, such as the invocations of the
Christian state during the inter-war period or more recently against Soviet communism.3

Religion, Secularism, and Constitutional Democracy (pp. 316-338). Columbia University Press. Retrieved
from http://www.jstor.org.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/stable/10.7312/cohe16870.16
3
For further history of Christianity and religion in Hungary see: Hanebrink, P. (2010). Christianity, Nation, State:
The Case of Christian Hungary. In Berglund B. & Porter-Szücs B. (Eds.), Christianity and Modernity in Eastern
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This utilization of Christianity as a unifying measure today furthers the rejection of
Muslim immigrants and refugees across the nation as well as at the highest levels of state.
Hungary’s relationship to the EU and other member states allows for the Orbán
administration to have success in supporting legally unacceptable practices, to an extent,
as Hungary and other Eastern European nations are equal members of the European
Union, their position, especially in the economic sector, is inferior to that of Western
member-states.
The Eastern European and ex-Soviet Union territories absorbed by the EU
expansion of 2004 transformed these regions into cheap labor markets to benefit EU
business interests (Bohle & Greskovits, p.10). Though manufacturing, agriculture, and
other labor intensive, low-credential sectors employ many Eastern EU citizens, the
factories, companies, and even banks remain predominantly foreign owned by citizens of
Western member-states (Roubini, 2009). Therefore, Hungary is in an economically
inferior yet essential position to support interests of western EU states like France, which
allows for more leeway in what is considered liberally acceptable in their policies.
However, this has begun to change slightly as Hungary has faced recent consequences for
certain anti-immigrant and illiberal actions. With closed and exclusionary immigration
policies, practices, and sentiments being rooted in the preference for ethnoreligious
homogeneity among the government and citizens of Hungary, the nation is a case both of
an analogous and oppositional to that of France and the larger EU.
The key political groupings which have been pushing for anti-immigration

Europe (pp. 61-84). Central European University Press. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/stable/10.7829/j.ctt1282b2.9
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policies in both France and Hungary as well as across the EU are ideologically
categorized as part of the right wing populist movement, and have been so viewed for
decades (Pappas, 2013, and Mudde, 2013). While right wing populist political parties do
not create anti-immigration sentiments or Islamophobia, their messages and platforms
have noticeably enhanced the mainstreaming of such stances (Mudde, 2013). Though
populism is an ideology utilized by many other political ideologies other than those that
are right leaning, the prevailing populist groups of Europe have been majority right-wing
in the past two decades. The dominant populist political parties of France and Hungary,
the RN and Fidesz respectively, are no exceptions to this right-wing mainstreaming, and
continue to function on their historical platforms. The RN and Fidesz, through their
outspoken leaders, rely on populism’s quintessential ‘us’ versus ‘them’ Manichean style
duality between the sovereign native population, and the elite who preferentially support
foreign peoples (Mudde, 2004). Thus, the anti-immigrant and institutionalized
Islamophobic policies are not surprising stances for Le Pen or Orbán to prefer. The
eminence and publicity of anti-immigration sentiments since then have been increasing in
part due to the prominence of these right-wing populist groups and their highly vocal
leaders.
Based on this context, the research question which drives this thesis is rooted in
the search for correlative synthesis of the relationships between immigration policy and
practice in the context of religious laws and preferences for both the governments and
citizens of France and Hungary as related to third country nationals immigrating to the
European Union, which is specifically focused on the refugees and asylum seekers who
are Muslim. Research which addresses the utilization of religion as the main factor of

5

marginalization of minority groups in the EU is the driving mechanism for the research
question: How does the relationship between immigration and religion effect Muslim
immigrants in policy, practice, and sentiment in France and Hungary?

Methodology
This paper is based near equally on both recent literature and quantitative survey
data from sources such as Pew Research Center and Eurostat. Primary sources, such as
domestic law and international treaties, are important to the legal foundations and
understandings of the European Union and its hierarchical relationships to the member
states and their sovereign policy practices. Secondary sources from academic journals,
periodicals, working papers, and other texts are the theoretical and intellectual
foundations of the ideologies, recent history, and discussions to come. As the political
underpinnings this thesis are that of populism, the work of Dr. Cas Mudde on the subject
was relied on as the crucial foundational literature and scholar on this ideology. By
processing such materials with lenses focused on liberalism, secularism, and
humanitarian concern, the research sources were selected with the goal of comprehension
of these ideologies as well as synthesis with practical understandings of the highly recent
and current relationships of the France and Hungarian lawmakers with their citizens and
immigrant populations inside the EU.
When selecting the case studies of France and Hungary there were three important
sources of variation the cases needed to provide for this research to demonstrate a level of
generalizability in patterns to the scope of the larger EU. The member-states which were
chosen for studying this relationship between immigration policy and religion in the EU

6

were selected as to look at the implications in a more liberally compliant state, France,
and one with more provocative and illiberal markers in policy, Hungary. This liberalilliberal divide between the two states policies and practices is best understood by
defining the two terms in this research context where liberal means support for ideals of
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, and human rights (“The EU in
Brief,” 2019) while illiberal references support for policies, practices, and norms which
are oppositional to any of these EU values. The populist parties of the two nations capture
this variation further as Le Pen of France’s RN has been attempting to remake the image
of her party as more liberally acceptable via her rhetoric and public stances becoming less
xenophobic and racist in appearance. However, this does not mean that Le Pen or RN
supporters are leftist in the content of their policy preferences, just that the way in which
the party is presenting its media image is attempting to conform to what attracts the most
support in France (Froio, 2018). This differs entirely from Orbán’s populist platform as
liberalism and political correctness are part of the ‘other’ group which Fidesz stakes their
platform firmly against (Pappas, 2013).
The next source of variation which the case study selections of France and
Hungary capture is in the east-west divide across Europe. As previously mentioned, the
eastern nations of the EU are viewed and institutionally positioned to be inferior the
western states, such as France, in economics, politics, and other norms. This western state
superiority complex is reflected most deeply in the economic sector, however these
differences extended into humanitarian policy and practice realms. The actions of eastern
bloc EU-states such as Hungary, Poland, or Bulgaria are all heavily criticized among EU
parliamentarians. However, these states are continually allowed to practice their less than
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favorable immigration policies as they secure the EU’s borders from the truly unwanted
refugees from the Middle East and North Africa. This in turn benefits the western states
who are not allowed to act outside of policy normalcy to the same extent as their eastern
counterparts, and without member-states such as Hungary to block immigrants from
accessing EU and Schengen zones, the western EU states could not continue to maintain
their more accepting policies on paper, no matter their practices.
While the east-west divide is highlighted best by the choices of France and
Hungary, they also capture some north-south divide variance in the European Union.
France, being grouped with the northern European states is due not only to geography but
wealth and stability as the northern states are divided along the same lines of prosperity
and superiority as those categorized western rather than eastern. While the gap between
the economic variances in the east-west divide have been narrowing this is not true for
the north-south economic divide which has been widening (Strupczewski & Guarascio,
2018). This is exemplified by the economic and humanitarian crises in Greece and Italy.
While Hungary is certainly grouped with the southern states in this division of the EU, it
is more accurately a reflection of eastern and central patterns, hence the north-south
variance is the weakest capture in this case selection strategy.
The final sources of variation that were predicted to occur across the two cases,
but were not actually selected for are the variances on immigration policies, the level to
which the right-wing populist parties have governmental power in the nation, religious
law variance, as well as Muslim population sizes. These are the dependent sources of
variation in the case studies.
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CHAPTER 1

IMMIGRATION & RELIGIOUS POLICIES

European Union
Though the roles and membership of France and Hungary in the European Union
have varied over time, at the peak of the immigration crisis in 2015 both member-states
were actively bound by the same legal norms and institutions. However, the ways in
which the nations handled the increasingly prominent position of immigrants varied
drastically over the next four years. France took a more proactive and liberally acceptable
approach, attempting to meet EU mandated quotas, integrate immigrants, and promote
multiculturalism. On the contrary, Hungary refuted quota plans, promoted ethnoreligious
homogeneity of white Christians, and scapegoated Muslim immigrant groups for both
domestic and international problems. Though France and the EU are not without their
own struggles in regards to the handling of immigration and religion, the variances
between the EU policies and those of these two member-states are notable.
While France has been a member nation of the EU since the original six nation
group in 1958 (France: European Union, 2019), Hungary was only able to join in 2004
with eight other eastern European nations, and Malta (Hungary: European Union, 2019).
Membership in the EU is marked by acceptance, compliance, and solidarity with all legal
protocols, as well as other member states. As the EU is founded in legality on the
international scale, a series of treaties which are foundational to the union are amended
occasionally, such as the updates during the 2004 EU expansion (EU Treaties: European
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Union, 2019). However, these treaties as well as new legislation are adopted
democratically with the European Parliament, thus, adoption and adherence to such
treaties, including the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, are the most basic conditions
of EU membership.
One of the foundational treaties which has explicit implications for unification on
EU immigration policy is the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, in Chapter 2: Policies on Border
Checks, Asylum and Immigration (Treaty of Lisbon). Since the goal of overarching
unification of EU policy on immigration and asylum for third country nationals is
legalized here, when the need for enhanced solidarity and competence during the
immigration wave in 2015 was evident, this treaty was used as the guide to proceedings.
Article 78 is most direct in asserting that the EU:
“shall adopt measures for a common European asylum system comprising:
…a uniform status of subsidiary protection for nationals of third countries
who, without obtaining European asylum, are in need of international
protection; …a common system of temporary protection for displaced
persons in the event of a massive inflow” (Consolidated Versions of the
Treaty on the European Union).
The President of the French Republic and the President of the Republic of Hungary are
both agreeing signatories to the Lisbon Treaty updates and reinforcement as of 2009
(Treaty of Lisbon). This and all EU enacted immigration policies are in accordance with
international humanitarian law, especially noting the parameters of human rights outlined
in the Geneva Convention.4
Additionally, foundational to the immigration policies set by the EU are the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Schengen Area, the Common

4

The text of the Geneva Convention: http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocitycrimes/Doc.33_GC-IV-EN.pdf
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European Asylum System, and the jurisdictions of the European Court of Human Rights
and the European Court of Justice.5 With its installation in 2012 to help with the unified
climate of the Lisbon Treaty, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
TFEU, solidified the legal and holistic approach with which the EU can set law within its
institutions (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union). The Schengen Area, verified in 1985 (European Commission, 2015b), is heavily
relied on in TFEU as the premises of the Schengen Area is a Europe without internal
borders. Therefore, with all cross-border travel of EU Schengen states being deregulated,
the need for common policy on all the external borders of the Schengen area of free travel
was required. This is where the TFEU both relied on and built up the legal validity of EU
capabilities regarding immigration policy at border controls. Both France and Hungary
are non-island Schengen area states, meaning they share the common, physical external
and internal border controls set by the EU legislative powers, as stated in TFEU, Article
67 (2) where member-states “shall frame a common policy on asylum, immigration and
external border controls, based on solidarity between Member States …stateless persons
shall be treated as third-country nationals” (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union). All third country-nationals are non-EU member
state citizens.
The Schengen boundaries and polices on border check procedures for immigrants
were set with the Common European Asylum System, CEAS, and its sub-regulations in

5

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Text:
https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT
Schengen Area and Cooperation Text:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al33020
European Court of Human Rights jurisdiction: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf
European Court of Justice: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/
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1999. While many forms of immigration law comprise CEAS, the most important legal
agreements are the Dublin Regulations or Dublin III (“Common European Asylum
System,” 2019). The Dublin Regulations established safeguards for the review and claim
making process of asylum in the EU, directing that the first EU member-state which the
asylum seeker arrives in is the state that is domestically responsible for that asylum
seeker’s application and review process for the right to immigration (European
Parliament, 2013). While the Dublin Regulations were meant to insure equality in burden
sharing of asylum applications, the regulations instead caused too large a burden to be
bore by Greece and Italy during 2015 as the majority of asylum seekers entered the EU
through these two nations Mediterranean coastlines. Due to the stress placed on these two
states under CEAS Dublin, the reallocation schemes and refugee quota plans were
created to cope with the unequal burden sharing of asylum seekers during the years of the
immigration crisis.
Upholding the legislation of the EU are the European Court of Human Rights and
the Court of Justice of the European Union, which both Hungary and France are within
jurisdiction of. While these courts are international legal mechanisms for dispute
settlement which have treaty laws, including punitive measures, to enforce their validity
and existence. For example, when Hungary was mandated to be compliant with the EU
Refugee Reallocation program in 2015, they failed their quota and passed laws
“criminalising activities in support of asylum and residence applications” (European
Commission, 2018). Thus the EU sent Hungary to the CJEU where they were found in
violation of the Commission’s requirements (Court of Justice of the European Union ,
2017). With a ruling in favor of the Commission program following, Hungary became the

12

first EU member-state which Article 7 of the founding Treaty of the European Union was
invoked against, via deeming Orbán’s Hungary a threat to the EU’s most precious values:
equality, judicial practices, corruption, and freedoms, including that of the freedom of
religion, are key at-risk concerns (European Parliament , 2018). With the reality of
sanctions or potential voting rights suspension built into the EU being actively utilized,
the punishments for not acting with solidarity over immigration demonstrates the EU’s
level of ideological commitment to equality. National compliance with international
standards is a clear requirement of the European Union.
Under the refugee reallocation plans from 2015, France was set to receive
between 11.87 - 14.17 percent, or a minimum of 2,375 persons, of the total immigrants
needing reallocation services from Greece and Italy, while Hungary was set to receive
between 1.53 - 1.79 percent, or a minimum of 307 persons (European Commission,
2015a, p. 22). France has completed 96% of their pledged immigration resettlement
program from 2015, while Hungary did not pledge any reallocation under the July 20,
2015 plan (European Commission, 2018a, p.53). Notably, Hungary participated fully in
their legal commitment to provide border guard officers for the European Border and
Coast Guard Agency, FRONTEX, at a total of 65; France also fully complied with this
requirement (European Commission, 2018a, p.25). The resource use choices by Hungary
under reallocation schemes is reflective of the stigma that refugees need to be kept out of
the nation rather than allowed in. Resettlement pledges were made again in 2018 under
the frame work of the European Juncker Commission, with France pledging to relocate
over 10,000 to this Resettlement and Legal Migration scheme, and Hungary pledging
zero (European Commission, 2018a, p.31). Yet Hungary is not alone in the refusal of EU

13

immigration reallocation schemes, as it was one of three member states to fail to respect
their legal obligations with regular pledges and relocations in this most recent round
(European Commission, 2018a, p.51).
While it is clear the EU has stark guidelines regarding immigration, they also
have policies about religious freedom which are more broadly defined in treaties and
foundational obligations. As the EU has no official religion and holds equality at the
heart of its values, continual assurances of religious freedoms are the focus of any and all
policy. In 2013, the EU adopted the Guideline on the Promotion and Protection of
Freedom of Religion or Belief as a manifestation of the EU’s policy commitment to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (International Cooperation and Development). The EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights is foundational to this series of guidelines with Article 10 of the Charter ensuring
the “freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” as well as Article 21 ensuring “nondiscrimination,” and Article 22 addressing “cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.”6
With such legal assurances made by the EU, the laws of each member state must be
accordance with the larger international legal obligations to the EU which are maintain
the solidarity on freedom of religion.
France
France has clear international legal obligations to meet as terms of EU
membership, and the state further possess a national level immigration policy. These
immigration policies are founded in the 1958 Constitution of the Fifth Republic of
France, in Article 53-1 (“France's Constitution of 1958 with Amendments through 2008,”

6

See the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 for the full legal text.
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p.18). This dual sentiment article outlines that the French government will uphold asylum
requests to the replicable standards of the other European states which partake in the
same “protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms,” as a solidarity assurance
(“France's Constitution of 1958 with Amendments through 2008,” p.18). The second part
of the article reserves France’s domestic right to extend asylum grants as they see fit,
beyond the terms of the other European standards (“France's Constitution of 1958 with
Amendments through 2008,” p.18). With France being party to CEAS and therefore the
Dublin Regulations, the solidarity assurances of the national policies proved to be held
true as France extended its compliance with the Refugee Quota system to ensure
solidarity and equality in the en masse immigration since 2015.
More technical parts of French immigration policy were recently revised and
enacted into law in September 2018 under la loi pour une Immigration Maîtrisée, un
Droit d’Asile Effectif et une Intégration Réussie, the Law for a Managed Immigration, an
Effective Right of Asylum and a Successful Integration (Loi no° 2018-778, 2018). While
this law has been received with acceptance by the EU, it was not without criticism from
leftist sects of the nation as well as sources such as Human Rights Watch. The HRW
critique called French law makers “shameful” for weakening safeguards for asylum
seekers with this bill through the curbed appeal rights brought on by decreasing the
asylum application deadline to 90 days (Marquis, 2018). There was also a two-fold
increase to the amount of detention time an illegal immigrant can face before deportation,
now 90 days as well (Marquis, 2018).
This 2018 law is an update to a law from two-years, la Loi Relative au Droit des
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Etrangers en France, the Law Regarding the Rights of Foreigners in France,7 which was
aimed at immigration for the retention of talent and business professionals as well as
expanding some rights for temporary visa and work permits will maintaining irregular
and illegal migration rules in accordance with preexisting EU directives (European
Migration Network, 2016, p.3). While the 2018 revisions were also aimed at making
immigration easier for those deemed ‘talented professionals’ in France, new implications
for asylum seeker’s rights were added. For example, subsidiary protection recipients
received an increase in their residence permit time from one to four years, and legality of
practice was granted to those assisting undocumented migrants exclusively for
humanitarian purposes (Marquis, 2018). However, asylum portions of French
immigration law were most heavily redefined in the 2016 law. Here, the national penal
code increased the level of criminality for the provision of false identity papers, and
chose to “reintroduction of controls at the internal borders” of France on other Schengen
zone nations (European Migration Network, 2016, p.2).
These internal borders controls in France were implemented as part of the national
response plan to the irregular immigrating flows following 2015, though the late 2015
terror attacks in Paris were the catalyzing moment in this choice. These border checks
were part of the national state of emergency which was set to last for two years from late
2015 through 2017 (Boring, 2016). These internal border controls were renewed in 2017,
when they were originally set to expire with the national state of emergency, to last until
the end of April 2019, reflecting still prevailing concerns about national security and

7

For full legal text in French, see:
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000032164264&categorieLien=id
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migration flows (European Commission, 2019a, p.1). France is one of eight Schengen
zone states set to have border controls expire this year, however France has not officially
declared if they will renew these internal border checks (European Commission, 2019a,
p.1). If they choose not to renew, all border check controls for immigrants entering
France would occur on exterior EU-Schengen borders. This leaves only direct arrivals,
such as air and maritime arrivals, from third-countries in the control of French customs.
The relationship between religion and state in France has a long history of
oppression as a source of conflict between an elitist bourgeoisie, which included a
powerful cleric class, and a systematically repressed proletariat.8 Within this social
context as a root cause of the French Revolution, the total removal of any linkage
between governance and religion was enacted fully by 1905 in la Loi Concernant la
Séparation des Eglises et de l'Etat, the Law Concerning the Separation of Church and
State, now commonly known as the French secular principle of laïcité (Loi du 9
décembre 1905 Concernant la Séparation des Eglises et de l’Etat, 2018). This particular
laïcité brand of secularism is not only legally adhered to over a century later, but is now a
foundational element of the French republic and societal norms.9
The principles of laïcité range from common secular-liberal values, with Article 1
ensuring the freedom of religion and thought or Article 2 formally renouncing any
religion of the state being recognized, all the way to Article 26 dictating that places of
regular religious service cannot hold political meetings (Loi du 9 décembre 1905
Concernant la Séparation des Eglises et de l’Etat, 2018). Following this deeply secular

8

For additional historical background see: https://muse-jhu-edu.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/article/716768
For additional history of laïcité see: http://www.pewforum.org/2005/12/09/100th-anniversary-ofsecularism-in-france/
9
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tradition, a 2004 banned all religious “clothing or other attire” from public schools, as
they receive state funds and thus must be a totally secular system (“Secularism and
Religious Freedom”). Additionally, the Parliamentary Commission to Study the Wearing
of the Full Veil in France spurred the 2011public national ban on the burka and niqab, the
full-face head coverings of deeply modest Muslim women.10 This direct attack on Islamic
practices by the state is till justified by political elites and the French public alike, citing
security concerns and incongruence with laïcité principles as legal reasons for the ban
(Atwill, 2010). It was not until late 2018 that a UN committee decisively said the French
government has violated Muslim women’s right to the freedom of religion, though
nothing has yet been done to change the legal system (UN Human Rights Committee,
2018). While these practices may seem extreme or even reversely oppressive, the French
view of their secularism is such that outwardly demonstrative religious practices infringe
on the:
“freedom of conscience for everyone; this includes the freedom to believe
or not to believe, to practice a religion, to be atheist, agnostic or to be an
adept of humanist philosophies, to change religion or to cease to have any
religion” (“Freedoms and Prohibitions in the Context of ‘Laïcité’”).
Under laïcité principles, public society is not a religious setting in France in order
to protect religious rights. For the French government, the total and complete separation
of church and state and public society is essential to maintaining religious freedom, thus
religions, especially Islam, which are not as easily conformist to this deep form
secularism are viewed as posing threats to the French way of life and values. While
formal restrictions on public religious display in France do exist and their immigration

10

See the full text of the law, in French here: http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/rap-info/i2262.pdf
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policies have faced a level of dissatisfaction, the laws and norms of Hungary deviate
from this secularism and liberal immigration practice in more restrictive ways.
Hungary
Hungary maintains many of the same basic tenets of both France and the
European Union as it continues to ensure the right of immigration and has no official
national religion in any policy. The constitution, the Fundamental Law of Hungary, was
rewritten in 2011 after Viktor Orbán was re-elected as Prime Minister the year prior after
a near decade long absence from holding the position since 2002. While Orbán and his
far-right party Fidesz have the reputation of perusing illiberal values which contradict the
ideals of the EU, the 2011 updated constitution still holds, in Article XIV, that Hungary
will:
“grant asylum to non-Hungarian citizens being persecuted or having a wellfounded fear of persecution in their native country or in the country of their
usual residence for reasons of race, nationality, membership of a particular
social group, religious or political belief” (Ministry of Justice Hungary,
2018, p.11).
Yet, the legal and political actions of the current government have been near
contrary to their own laws, and therefore the EU. In early 2018, a new series of
immigration restrictions were passed by the Hungarian Parliament almost unanimously in
the form of amendments to their: Constitution, Police Act, Act on Asylum, Criminal
Code, Act on the State Border, and the Act on Misdemeanours (The Hungarian
Government, 2018). Both the government and public referenced this as the ‘Stop Soros’
legislative package, referring to the Hungarian-American mogul George Soros and his
liberal, pro-immigration sentiments. This bill included an amendment to Article XIV
mentioned above stating that entering Hungary through a nation which is not posing
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direct threat to the immigrant or asylum seeker will not entitle them to asylum (Ministry
of Justice Hungary, 2018). This is a direct attack on the EU refugee quota system as
Hungary has now domestically illegalized the moving of reallocation plan immigrants
from their technically non-persecuted locations in Italy or Greece. This legislative
packaged was the defining choice for the EU to move against Hungary in infringement
procedures in September of 2018 (The Hungarian Government, 2018, p.73).
According to the unofficial English translation of this new legal package,
provided by the Hungarian human rights organization and UN Refugee Agency Partner
since 1998, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee and the Minister of Interior, both
“facilitating unlawful residence” and “facilitation of illegal immigration” have been
added to the Criminal Code (Pintér, 2018, p.5). The legal definition of facilitating illegal
immigration was redefined in section 11 of the Criminal Code to include “anyone who
provides financial means for committing the criminal offence specified in Subsection (1),
or who regularly carries out such organisational activities, is punishable by a term of
imprisonment of up to one year,” (Pintér, 2018, p.6). The first subsection now includes
criminal offenses for all who are part of “unlawful crossing of the border barrier…
damaging the border barrier… the obstruction of the construction work on the border
barrier… [and] human smuggling” (Pintér, 2018, p.2). While these latter three additions
are seemingly harmless, the wording enables the law to be applied to humanitarian
providers of assistance to undocumented individuals, which is in exact opposition to the
law which France just passed. Amidst this legal battle around immigration and the refusal
to accept immigrants as part of the EU Commission Program, Hungary still reported
accepting 36,453 immigrants in 2017, over 10,000 higher than their 2015 number at the
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peak of the immigration crisis (Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2018b). Of these in
2017 immigrants, 3,397 were asylum applicants only 106 individuals were granted
refugee status and another 1,100 were subsidiary protection recipients (Hungarian Central
Statistical Office, 2018a). However, the immigrants whom Hungary chooses to grant
asylum are often not those in the most need, with the nation’s practices of immigration
being geared biasedly in favor of those who fit the traditional ethnoreligious composition
of Hungary better than a refugee who is from the Middle East or is Muslim would.
The Fundamental Law of Hungary is also the basis and bias source of religious
policies. The preamble beings with “God bless the Hungarians” and the National Avowal
maintains outright four references to Christianity, including homage to a saint who “made
our country part of Christian Europe,” as well as “we recognise the role of Christianity in
preserving nationhood,” while the separation of church and state is simultaneously
guaranteed in Article VII (3) (Ministry of Justice, 2018, p.2, 9). Additionally, “everyone
shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion” is secured by the
same article in section one (Ministry of Justice, 2018, p.9). Article XV also secures all
fundamental rights “without discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, sex, disability,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
any other status” (Ministry of Justice, 2018, p.11).
However, the Law on the Right to Freedom of Conscience and Religion, and on
Churches, Religions and Religious Communities in 2011, part of Orbán’s constitutional
reboot required all religious groups to reregister for ‘church’ status perks by process of
Act C: “For an association to be recognized as a church, the vote of two-thirds of the
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Members of Parliament shall be required” (Ministry of Justice, 2018, and Hungarian
Parliament, 2011, p.5). This law placed direct control of church status benefits such as tax
breaks and religious representation in the military, in control of the government. The
outcome produced a serous hindrance to religious freedom as the total number of
‘church’ status religious houses was reduced from 350 to just 14 (United States
Department of State, 2012, p.8). Hungarian politicians still currently hold this right to
dictate which select religions receive benefits via the creation of an annex of recognized
‘church’ status denominations (Hungarian Parliament, 2011, p.17).
The first annex of just 14 religions approved with the initial law consisted of 11
various Christian religions, and 3 Jewish groups (Hungarian Parliament, 2011, p.17).
Notably, there is no mention of Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism or any other Hungarian
minority religion as state recognized. When outrage ensued from the exclusion all nonJudeo-Christian religious affiliations, an expanded annex of 18 more religions were
added two months later, which included two Islamic organizations (United States
Department of State, 2012, p.3). The annex now totals at thirty-two lawfully recognized
church status groups by the government, but the direct attempts by the Orbán government
to exile certain religions should not go unrecognized (United States Department of State,
2012, p.8). Thus, the official stance of the Hungarian government on religion is
technically secular, but religion, specifically in the form of Christian unity, is used as a
sociopolitical platform for a variety of parties, policies, and campaigns, including current
controlling party Fidesz.
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CHAPTER 2

IMMIGRATION PRACTICES & SENTIMENTS

The implementation of all policies regarding immigration looks far different in
practice than on paper for every nation. Unfortunately, even the best laid polices for safe
and effective immigration often fall short in many ways ranging from health practices,
timeliness of process, selection biases, and even human rights violations. Compounding
the problem of policy implementation are the xenophobic sentiments of different far-right
groups. With portions of France and Hungary’s populations maintaining staunch
opposition to immigrants, continuous problems have unfolded across both nations even as
the total number of immigrants has continuously declined since its peak, suggesting
ideological opposition to immigrants is sourced from a deeper level of opposition than
solely xenophobia.

France
Across France, immigrant slums such as the Calais Jungle, which at its peak was
the largest “informal refugee camp [in France] with a population of 10,000 before its
demolition in November 2016,” have been dismantled in an attempt to provide not only
better policy practice but improve the image and reputation of the nation (Dhesi, Iskajee,
& Davies, 2018, p.140). However, best practice of the immigration process is still not
being fully implemented. The mal-practices at the Calais camp, including issues ranging
from food scarcity and lack of safe water, to unsafe shelters and inadequate waste
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disposal systems, demonstrate a lack of effectivity in domestic immigration practices
(Dhesi, Iskajee, & Davies, 2018). Though the Calais camp has been demoloished, it was
not the only refugee encampment in France with others, whether set up by the
government or not, existing in Dunkirk at La Linière, multiple sites around Paris, and a
many across the southern regions near the Mediterranean and Italy, such as the
accommodations in Marseille.11 The government supplied shelter programs for asylum
seekers come in five types, ranging from the most prominent called CADA, Center
d’Accueil de Demandeurs d’Asile, which has 40,450 spots for regular reception, to
emergency shelters programs such as AT-SA, Accueil Temporaire – Service de l’Asile,
with just shy of 6,000 places or HUDA, Hébergement d’Urgence Dédié aux Demandeurs
d’Asile, with over 18,000 (Saligant, 2017). The existence of these shelter programs is
meant to diminish the existence of unofficial encampments, which are part of the ongoing
problems due to the lack of capacity to receive and maintain large numbers of asylum
seekers during the application process. Such contained settlement programs are
contributing to failing sociocultural assimilations of France’s immigrants, as well as
giving certain political groups highly visible reference points for why they are antiimmigrant.
Though there are distinct struggles for those living for months and even years
inside these encampments, the forces driving immigrant masses to settling in both official
and informal groupings is not only due to unprecedented influx numbers, but rather by

11

Of the five types of shelter operations for asylum seekers in France, there were 80,221 places available in
2017 with locations in: Auvergne Rhône-Alpes, Bourgogne Franche-Comté, Bretagne, Centre, Grand Est,
Hauts de France, Ile de France, Normandie, Nouvelle Aqutaine, Occitainie, Provence Alpes Côte d’Azur,
and Pays de la Loire. See link for full details of shelter types by location, page 81 in particular:
http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-download/aida_fr_2017update.pdf
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the bureaucratic processing of these immigrants’ papers. Out of France’s 145,000
applicants for immigration papers in 2015-2016, 59% of those were still waiting for
decisions on their submitted applications at the start of 2017 (Connor, 2017, p.10). It is
this timely and costly waiting process for asylum applicants that gives rise to
encampments and substandard living conditions. Additionally, Eurostat reports only 3%
of those who are denied their asylum application are being returned to their state of origin
(Connor, 2017, p.3), leaving them illegally residing inside the EU, mostly in poverty as
they are now both undocumented and stateless.
The first time asylum applicant rejection rate in France was reported by the
Ministry of Interior to be at 73.2% in 2017 out of the 100,000 applications received
(Saligant, 2017, p.9). Demonstrated in figure 1 below, the 2017 the top six applicant
nationalities were Albanian, Afghani, Haitian, Sudanese, and Guinean, and then Syrian
(Saligant, 2017, p.9). While the correlation between Albanians being the top awaiting
decision applicants across the EU at the start of 2017 is therefore an unsurprising statistic
for the France, almost all Syrian applications were processed with only 20% still awaiting
decision across the EU, while 89% of the total Albanian applications had not yet been
responded to (Connor, 2017, p.8). Though appeal procedures exist, they are also timely
and inefficient, with only 16.7% of appeal decisions being positively overturned to
refugee status or protection grants (Saligant, 2017, p.10). The average wait time for a
decision on an individual’s right to asylum over 2015-2016 was five to seven months in
France, regardless of nationality (Connor, 2017, p.12).
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Figure 1: This figure shows the rates of status reception by percent of total based on country of origin
nationality in France during 2017 for: refugee status, rejection rates, and subsidiary protection.

While the conditions at immigration sites and the timeliness of the application
processing for asylum seekers are the largest contributing factors to the less than prefect
practice of immigration policy in France, there are larger sociotropic attitudes of portions
of the French population which help build stigmas around refugees. Though these are not
the majority sentiment or political alignment of the voting population of France as 79%
support taking refugees (Connor, 2018), and 58% from another study conducted a year
prior do not support the sentiment that immigrants place a burden on the welfare systems
of the nation (Special Eurobarometer 469, 2018, p.77), there is support for far-right
messages which stage themselves in populism, nationalism, and xenophobia.
Specifically nationalism as a majority preference on immigration is exemplified
by 2018 survey data which showed that only 5% fewer people who approved of taking
immigrants in France disapproved of the EU handling (Connor, 2018), displaying the
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favorability of the domestic level policy rather than the EU legal policies. This is further
supported by only 11% of those polled feeling that there are difficulties for immigrants in
accessing national, long term residence permits, which directly contradicts the almost 2/3
rejection rate by OFII, L’Office Français de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration, the French
Office of Immigration and Integration (“France - Visas: Long Stay Visa”, and Special
Eurobarometer 469, 2018, p.101). On the national political stage of France, the RN leads
the manifestation of this type of nationalism in their right-wing populism which thrives
on extreme sovereign nationalism.
These public views combined with challenging access to the domestically
provided residence permits highlights a relationship not uncommon in EU member states
where there is overall disapproval for the international level polices on immigration,
while the national level policies and practices are seen as less problematic. This has
created “a perfect storm for populists” (Mudde, 2016) where platforms like the RN’s can
thrive on these sentiments of taking back national control by manipulating the
composition of population through immigration restrictions. Though the EU treaties on
legal solidarity over immigration is foundational to the practices of the entire union,
national level process preferences reinforce the reluctance of domestic governments to
comply with international immigration solidarity (Hampshire, 2015, p.544). With the EU
citizens possessing a majority negative view in regards to their handling of immigration,
the political future of France could see favoring of less centrist candidates than Macron,
or even a move towards further popularity for the RN and Le Pen.
The sentiments of anti-immigration in the RN are in contrast to the values of the
EU and France national policies. This is demonstrated by 56% of RN supporters in 2017
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agreeing that their culture is superior to others, specifically immigrant’s culture (Stokes,
2018). Islam in particular evoked enhanced culturally xenophobic sentiments as 66% of
those RN supporters concluded Muslim culture was especially incompatible with French
ways (Stokes, 2018). While 64% of French citizens identify as Christian even if they are
not active practitioners (Sahgal et al., 2018, p.8), the nations has the largest Muslim
population in Europe Union, at 8.8% of the total population or 5.7 million people as of
2016 (Hackett, 2017a).12
For those adhering to RN style populism, Muslims, who have been directly
correlated with immigration, represent a loss of civilizational identity (Brubaker, 2017),
as the foundation of the platform around immigration is “not simply anti-immigration,
but opposed to the immigrant as a symbol of loss of sovereignty” (Mondon, 2015, p.144)
which top-down EU polices are further enabling (Hampshire, 2016, p.542). Of this same
group of Rassemblement National supporters, 74% look favorably on the claim that “it is
important to have been born here to truly be one of us,” highlighting the hybrid nativist,
nationalist, and ethnocentric nature of anti-immigration stance among the French populist
party (Stokes, 2018). Though the RN, under Marine Le Pen’s guidance, has been
reshaping its image by using more widely accepted “sociocultural liberalism” (Brubaker,
2017, p.1195) as a rhetorical practice to gain more support in the mainstream, their antiimmigration platform is still rooted in a “nativist rhetoric…[of] sophisticated from[s] of
exclusion referred to as new or neo-racism, cultural racism, or cultural differentalism,”
(Mondon, 2015, p.144). Immigration practices and sentiments in this vein, though still
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This number is actually second to Bulgaria (out of available data) which is 11% Muslim (Hackett,
2017a). While Bulgaria is an EU member, the nation is not part of the Schengen Area nor it is a Euro
monetary state. Bulgaria has taken 50 refugees from the quota plan which falls far short of their 1300person quota mandate.
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minority held sentiments in France, have been gaining increased support and clearly
influencing the experience of immigrants.

Hungary
The immigration compliances of Hungary are not within European Union
regulation as the practices those seeking the right to immigration and especially asylum
seekers are substandard. The Hungarian government’s strong nationalism and populist
character has given rise to institutionalized anti-immigrant majority sentiments. This has
been targeted directly at Muslim immigrants for years, with 72% of the population
possessing an unfavorable view of Muslims (Hackett, 2017a). This is doubly
demonstrated by Muslims being the main religious target of both nationalist political
actors, parties, and social groups in the Hungary (Kishi et al., 2018, p.7), even though
only 0.4% of the Hungarian population is estimated to be Muslim (Hackett, 2017a).
Such religiously motivated biases can be tied to the statistic that as of 2018 a
majority of those polled, at 54%, still opposed taking refugees fleeing violence or war in
their home countries (Connor, 2018), which is reflective of the opposition to taking
immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa. In a nation where 64%
“seldom/never” attend religious services (Cooperman et al., 2017, p.70), yet 76% of
Catholics in the same year said that “their religious identity is mainly a matter of national
culture/family tradition,” (Cooperman et al., 2017, p.56), evident is of the loss of
religious practice but not identity in these post-communist regime decades. Orbán in
particular has revived political ties to religion in Hungary via purporting that “Christian
politics [will be] able to protect people” (Kingsley, 2018) where the liberal politics of the
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EU fail. This attitude would not be able to maintain such popularity among the Hungarian
citizens without the deeply rooted feeling that Christianity is tied to the nationalist
Hungarian identity. The sentiments of the people match the vocalizations of the far-right
populist party that Fidesz is, where their key characteristics as both “their opposition to
immigration and to the EU,” (Hampshire, 2015, p.545).
This rejection of difference and preference for a homogenous society is a root of
the larger anti-immigration practices in the nation. During the 2015-2016 period in
Hungary, 94% of all asylum applicants still had not received a decision on their paper
work as of the start of 2017 (Connor, 2017, p.10). Important to this statistic, the
Immigration and Asylum Office of Hungary, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal, and
Eurostat reported that over 66% of these applications were withdrawn for reapplication in
other nations (Connor, 2017, p.10) as Hungary is not the ideal end location for
immigrants and refugees seeking a new home in the EU. Hungary marks a milestone for
refugees as it is the first Schengen zone country with other internal Schengen borders on
the Balkan migration corridor. With applications not being processed and borders being
blocked, including a $1.16 billion wall at the Serbian and Croatian border in 2015 (“We
Stopped Migration with a €1billion Border Fence”, 2018), moving towards better lives in
more pro-immigration and non-xenophibic nations such as Germany or France have been
stalled. This caused the main migration route to shift from the southern Hungarian
borders to those of Slovenian, an even less equipped state to deal with en masse
immigration (Kasparek, 2016, p.6). This reassertion of nation-state sovereignty through
anti-immigration practices is a consistent touchstone for the Hungarian government
(Hampshire, 2015).
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The top three nationalities of non-regional migrants using the western Balkan route in
2017 were Afghani, Pakistani, and Syrian, followed by Iraqis and Algerians according to
the FRONTEX agency (2018, p.18). Shown in figure 1.1 below, this coincided almost
exactly to the nationalities of top applicants for protection in Hungary in 2017, ranking:
Afghani, Iraqi, Syrian, Pakistani, and Iranian (Pardavi, Matevžič, Iván, & Bakonyi, 2017,
p.7), even though the most common nationalities for migrants actually allowed to live in
Hungary in 2017 were all from other European nations (“Origins and Destinations of the
World’s Migrants 1990-2017,” 2018).

Figure 1.1: Display of rates by percent of total for rejection rates, humanitarian protection status, refugee
status, and subsidiary protection status recipients in Hungary, during 2017.

This data shows that 69.1% of total applications from 2017 were rejected (Pardavi
et al., 2017, p.7). The ability of those in control of immigration practices to use support
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Islamophobia and homogeneity is shown best by the protection rates provided to the 6
applications for protection submitted by Georgian nationals, the only majority Christian
nation in the top asylum seeker application nationalities. Georgians were the only
nationality to receive any protection without rejection. Consistent xenophobia in the
rhetoric of anti-immigration platforms in Hungary are founded on the non-Christian
character of majority of those seeking asylum. The populist right in Hungary maintains
these sentiments through “poaching…traditional conservative themes such as family,
god, order, and the fatherland,” (Pappas, 2013, p.11) rooted in the fear of “the original
population [being] defiled or destroyed,” (Mondon, 2015, p.144). Islamic practices have
been institutionally rejected by attempting to limit their population in its entirety in
Hungary.
While rejection based on ethnoreligious perceptions is a reality in Hungary, there
are larger problems on the external borders of the nation in their transit zones.
Application for asylum upon airport arrival is considered a crime suitable for detention,
thus those who arrive and apply for asylum at Budapest International are procedurally
detained in accordance with the national Asylum Act (Pardavi et al., 2017, p.41). Since
very few people are detained this way and sent to Nyírbátor, the single functioning
asylum seeker detention facility in Hungary, overcrowding is not an issue here, but
overall conditions are poor (Pardavi et al., 2017, p.85). Basic medical care is provided,
however Nyírbátor was infested with bed bugs, physical ill-treatment by guards is
reported, and detained asylum seekers are treated as criminals via being “handcuffed and
escorted on leashes” to their court hearings (Pardavi et al., 2017, p.86). While these
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conditions are less than desirable, the situation at the transit zone facilities are of equally
poor and often worse quality.
Röszke and Tompa, both on the Hungarian-Serbian border that tops the Balkan
migration route, are transit zones that have effectively been made into detention facilities.
Both locations have severe overcrowding, with Röszke housing almost three times more
people than capable, with a reported capacity of 450, but currently detaining 1,252,
and Tompa in a similar state reporting more than four times its capacity, at 855 with the
facility only outfitted to hold 205 people (Pardavi et al., 2017, p.85). These are remote
border locations, and the facilities are made from shipping containers surrounded by
barbwire fences which managed by armed guards where asylum seekers are held as they
try to enter the nation (Pardavi et al., 2017, p.82; McKinsey, 2017).
While there are varying reports on the transit zone conditions depending on
sources, most agree on the basic facts that conditions are substandard and even in
violation of human rights. During their time held in transit zones while waiting for
application review, asylum seekers remain disconnected from the outside world due to
lack of service connections, and the people are treated similarly to criminals, again with
reports of detained immigrants being handcuffed when taken anywhere outside the transit
zones, including hospitals (Pardavi et al., 2017, p.87). The medical care is minimal and
limited to minor physical ailments, with a lack of almost any infrastructure to deal with
psychiatric or emergency care, reflecting the same level of equipment at Nyírbátor
(Pardavi et al., 2017, p.88). The Hungarian Helsinki Committee has currently submitted
eight cases for interim measure requests due to human rights violations at the transit
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zones to the European Court of Human Rights, with all cases being successfully ruled in
favor of the asylum seeker’s rights by the ECHR (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2017).
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CHAPTER 3

RELIGIOUS PRACTICES & SENTIMETNS

The European Union has been described the most secular region of the world, and
while this does hold true in many regards, religious attachment for reason beyond
practice of faith is still prominent. As exemplified by the rhetorical practices, policy
initiatives, and surveys of domestic populations’ sentiments and values, freedom of
religion with deep regard for the secular is prominent in France. Yet, there are distinct
issues taken with Islam which underscores this. This same generalization is true in
Hungary, however, it is more openly defiant in rejecting equality standards of people
from differing ethnoreligious heritages. Though both practices and sentiments around
religion do differ in nature and strength cross-nationally, there are similar patterns in the
populist discourse around religion and immigration. There are distinct domestic
undercurrents in both France and Hungary which suggest these guaranteed rights to
freedom of religion are not always practiced or desired equally across the religious
spectrum. Understanding religious practice as part of identity in both cases are essential
in understanding why there is success in framing anti-immigration sentiments in a neoracist context opposed to non-Christian practices.
France
The populations of those characterized as highly religious in France and Hungary
are barley different in ratio, at 12% in France and 17% in Hungary (Evans & Baronavski,
2018). Regarding laïcité governance of the French socio-political system, this small
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group that practices religion most regularly is not a surprising outcome in a culture
defined by secularism. Notably, levels of strict religiosity in France is not a practice
exclusively prescribed to by the majority Christian population. French Muslims are
equally as secularized as their Christian counter parts, with weekly Islamic religious
observation at 10-12% of the population, with only 5% weekly mosque participation
(Kuru, 2008, p.3). While secularization has been a trend for more than a century and
Muslims are the most rapidly growing religious population in the world (Lipka &
Hackett, 2017), 64% of the French population still identifies as Christian (Sahgal et al.,
2018, p.8).

27.2%
64%
8.8%

Figure 2: This figure shows the religious demography of France as percentages of the total population,
with Christians and Muslims highlighted as the two key variable religions for comparison. The areas in the
chart are not in correct size-percentage proportion.

Yet, this Christian religious population does not hold a majority negative
sentiment about Muslims or immigrants as 85% of people say they are willing to accept
Muslims as a neighbor (Sahgal et al., 2018, p.65), and 79% know a Muslim personally
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(Gardner & Evans, 2018). In fact, only 29% of French respondents in a 2017 survey
viewed Muslims in a negative light, which was the second lowest score in the entire EU28 data set (Hackett, 2017a). For France these perception between the traditionally
Christian native population and the view of Muslims reflects the national sentiment that
only 32% of people hold Christianity as important to French national identity (Diamant &
Gardner, 2018). Additionally, the calculated NIM (Nationalist, anti-Immigrant and antiMinority) scale score of France was a 2.5, on a 1 to 10 scale with 10 being the most
negative in view point, and only 19% of respondents scoring over a 5.1 (Diamant & Starr,
2018). However, the overall trend for Western Europe was that, “both church-attending
and non-practicing Christians are more likely than religiously unaffiliated adults in
Western Europe to voice anti-immigrant and anti-minority views,” (Sahgal et al., 2018,
p.20). Archaic religious rivalry can still be a motivator for sentiments about immigration,
and it is this Christianism which is often exploited by right-wing populist parties
(Brubaker, 2017, p.1198).
The political discourse in France which ties immigration to religion is supported
by influential far-right groups aligned to the main political proponent of anti-immigration
and anti-Islam policies, the Rassemblement National. Long before leader Marine Le Pen
began efforts to revive the RN’s image as more acceptable to the liberal mainstream, the
Le Pen party had been categorized as a far-right and populist. Using Mudde’s 2004
definition of populism, as follows, the stance of the RN on Islamic immigration can be
more fully understood as:
“an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous
and antagonist groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues
that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the
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people,” (Mudde, 2004, p.543).
Based on this definition and the pathological normalcy of populist radical right parties,
PRRPs, in Europe (Mudde, 2013, p.1) the position of the RN as a PRRP can be defined
as being against the “corrupt, metropolitan, urban elite” who’s class supports
progressivism and political correctness (Mudde, 2004, p.550, 561), while also being
rooted in nativism and authoritarianism (Mudde, 2013, p.3). Importantly, the RN and its
other European counter parts do not actually create anti-immigration or anti-Muslim
sentiments, but rather provide a radicalizing voice to these already latent ideas (Mudde,
2003, p.14) by using common liberal rhetoric or values to attempt to make their
marginalizing preferences appear more legitimate and conformist (Froio, 2018, p.705). In
other words, the RN uses “illiberal invocations of liberalism” (Brubaker, 2017, p.1193) to
mainstream anti-immigration and Islamophobic sentiments.
Understanding this political and ideological rhetoric is essential to discerning how
and why there is enough support for RN candidates and messages so that party members
have become highly involved in the French political scene. A 2018 study was designed to
find which type of neo-racist framework provided the most visibility online in the
network of the French far-right, demonstrating what both leaders and followers were
most attracted to (Froio, 2018). The evidence found that an ultra-secular dimension based
on religious neo-racism provided the most visibility (Froio, 2018, p.703). What this, and
the small population of highly religious populations imply to the larger conversation
around immigration linked to religion is that “Christianity is embraced not as a religion
but as a civilizational identity understood in antithetical opposition to Islam” (Brubaker,
2017, p.1194). The practice of Christianity is not what makes it a foundational element to
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nativists, nationalists, and Islamophobes, but rather the signal of Christianity as a
common, cultural value allows for it to be propagandized as a secular ideal which other
religious affiliations cannot conform to.
This convergence of secularism as a liberally acceptable value, which however
excludes Islam because it is outwardly demonstrative and not the nativist religion of
France, combined with (minority) popular religion-based racism, explains both the
mainstream radical value of Islamophobia and the RN’s vocal role in purporting that
Muslim immigrants are a negative influence on France as a whole. With Le Pen
consistently citing Muslims immigrants as the key issue that threatens the French
civilization (Agnew and Chassany, 2017), and the increasing popularity of xenophobic
and more acutely Islamophobic sentiments and rhetoric across France, are directly
correlated to the activism of the pro-RN populist as their ‘way of life’ is perceived to be
challenged by this new population (Mudde, 2004, p.547).
Hungary
Religious practices, populations, and preferences remain dominated by variants of
Christianity in Hungary, even as the sentiments, policies, and rhetoric of the nation,
specifically its leaders, target Islam and Muslims. Christian identifying sects make up at
least 76% of Hungary’s religious demography (United States Department of State, 2017,
p.2), while Muslims are only 0.4% of the population (Hackett, 2017a), even after the
immigrant influxes since 2015 from predominantly Islamic nations. Anti-immigration
campaigns have increased Islamophobia, with 72% of Hungarian respondents viewing
Muslims in a negative light (Hackett, 2017a), which could be linked to the sentiment
among 43% of Hungarians feeling that Christianity is important to their national identity
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(Diamant and Gardner, 2018). While attachment to national Christianity is still a minority
preference, it is a strong one as well as a highly propagandized opinion as a minority
almost as small as France’s are considered highly religious (Evans & Baronavski, 2018).

23.6%
76%
0.4%

Figure 2.1: This figure shows the religious demography of Hungary as percentages of the total population,
with Christians and Muslims highlighted as the two key variable religions for comparison. The areas in the
chart are not in correct size-percentage proportion.

Yet, the outright preference of Christianity as a unifying culture for the Hungarian
people, as well as the entire European civilization, has been a repetitive message for
Orbán. The maintenance of Hungary’s Christian identity has be at the forefront of
Orbán’s platform, making public statements such as “central Europe should be national
and Christian” (Orbán, 2018), or referring to the 150 years of Ottoman rule over the
region when explaining how Hungarians know they do not want to live with Muslims
(Mackey, 2015).13 This rhetoric translating into policy has effectively eliminated the
space for those who prescribe to a religious affiliation other than variants of Christendom,

13

The Ottoman Empire ruled over the area of modern day Hungary from 1549-1699 C.E.
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but this has been especially true for the followers of Islam. Since the 2011 ‘Church Law’
only two Islamic churches have gained recognition under the strict guidelines of the legal
framework (United Sates Department of State, 2012, p.3). They are the Hungarian
Islamic Community, which proudly displays its official letter of recognition from the
state of Hungary on its website (Hungarian Islamic Community 2012), and the Hungarian
Islamic Council, both of which are Sunni organizations. With the strong hybridof
Christian-nationalism in the highest levels of the Hungarian government, and the
Islamophobic stance of nearly three quarters of national respondents, acknowledging the
interrelated relationship of these two elements is key to exploring Orbán’s populist
sociopolitical platforms.
As discussed in reference to France, the roots of the populist movement both
inside Hungary and elsewhere are steeped in nationalism, the heartland people’s desires,
and charismatic leadership (Mudde, 2004). For Viktor Orbán, his nationalist motives
have strong ethnocentric roots which both support and condemn the practices of
individuals based not only on their place of origin, exemplified through the ethnic
rejection of Syrian and Iraqi refugees as 69% of Hungarian respondents seeing larger
numbers of them as a major threat, but also their religion (Poushter, 2016). For Muslims
in Hungary, cited as the most persecuted religious group by nationalist parties inside most
of the European Union (Kishi et al.,2018, p.7), Islam’s existence props up the platform of
parties such as Fidesz, that hail a white nationalist and Christian identity. Additionally,
homogeneity is the preference of not only Orbán, but a majority of the population, as
56% of Hungarians “say it is better if society consists of people from the same
nationalities, religions and cultures,” (Cooperman, A. et al., 2017, p.43). Orbán has been
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a linchpin in mainstreaming the Fidesz party as the “defender of the cultural nation, the
traditionalist rural and religious social strata” since 1993 (Pappas, 2013), leading up to
the institutionalization of anti-Islam and pro-Christian discourse. Evident in Orbán’s now
three-decade prominence in the Hungarian political scene, the salience his party has
brought to anti-immigration is spurred by the practice of “re-redefining of the people in a
manner that they had always been implicitly denied in the pre-multicultural society –
namely ethnically homogenous” (Mudde, 2013, p.10), as well as religiously homogenous.
With Hungary being characterized as an illiberal, populist democracy due to the
government dominance by Fidesz and the Jobbik Party, which is also of the far-right
populist persuasion, the civilizationist framing of ethno-religious issues has become
common place (Pappas, 2013). The “keep Europe Christian” (Mackey, 2015) ideals of
Orbán highlights the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ divide well beyond national boundaries, but
towards a civilization based threat from Islam and immigrants much like notorious work
of Samuel Huntington14 or Edward Said’s15 orientalist scholarship (Brubaker, 2017,
p.1200). The larger civilizationist identity of Hungarian populism relates distinctly to
Christianism which, like in France, is not rooted in practice or religiosity, but rather in the
value of “secularized Christianity-as-culture” (Brubaker, 2017, p.1199). To keep
Hungarians united in this way requires Orbán to root his discourse in these longstanding
national themes while excluding liberalism. This causes Orbán and Fidesz to differ from
France’s RN or even the Jobbik party, which practice liberal value signaling inside their
rightist rhetoric (Brubaker, 2107, p.1208). By Fidesz leading a “systematic attack on
liberal institutions,” (Pappas, 2013, p.19), the differences between France and Hungary as

14
15

For S. Huntington’s work see: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. (1996)
For E. Said’s work see: Orientalism. (1994)
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well as a larger east-west divide in European populism is exemplified. This division
occurs over the value of liberalism where it is not a civilizational identifier in Hungary or
eastern Europe, but rather another hallmark of foreign rule and Euroscepticism
(Brubaker, 2017, p.1208). While the civilizational unification of Hungarians can extend
to Europe in a larger sense based on white secular Christianity, Orbán’s illiberalism,
manifested outright in anti-multiculturalism and Islamophobic propaganda, is a divergent
point in the rhetoric and practices of populisms the RN and Fidesz.
Between France and Hungary, a level of dysfunction in policy implementation in
both EU-level and domestic policies is highlighted. Failures in timeliness, compliance
with regulations, and routine inefficiency in the asylum and refugee process make the
already difficult transition for these immigrants wholly more difficult. The sentiments of
both majority and minority sects of the two case study nation’s populations have seen
rising negativity around immigration and Islam in particular, which has become a
politicized mainstream topic due to decades of PRRP presence. While the policies remain
open and free in France more so than Hungary, the far-right and populist sociopolitical
persuasion has been forming a marginalizing “religio-civilizational” identity (Brubaker,
2017, p. 1212) where those who are not identified as the native people of Europe are
excluded.
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CONCLUSION & SYNTHESIS

The case studies of France and Hungary, as related to each nation’s relationship
between immigration and religion in policies, practices, and sentiments have exposed key
links between the two. Analysis of each nation’s power relationship with the European
Union and its policies reveals that the EU maintains top-down control of the legal and
institutional systems inside the Union, however citizens are less approving of its
international policies which appear to infringe upon rights which are held close to a sense
of national sovereignty, such as immigration policy. The policy hierarchies in the EU
have unique implications in the realm of immigration because of this, even though the
EU has set decisive and legally binding expectations for solidarity on immigration policy
through decades of treaty law. However, these standards have been undermined and
disregarded by Hungary and other member-states with increasing frequency.
The lack of accountability of member-states to the EU has allowed for policies
which are exclusionary to increase in prominence, demonstrating a level of dysfunction
in the EU rooted in domestic immigration practice prevailing over parts of internationally
agreed upon treaties. This decreased accountability in the realm of immigration policy in
Hungary is however unsurprising as the nation is designed to have less prominent
position in the EU which is used for the western states’ economic betterment. This is
underscored by average household wages in France being over double what they are in
Hungary (OCED, 2018a, 2018b). With EU deregulation and the turning of a blind eye to
certain practices being utilized as norms in Hungary, the neo-racism in Orbán’s polices
are given more leeway to behave in this illiberal manner. Though power of EU law
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remains dominant over member-states, upholding and furthering the ability of its
parliament and commissions to override certain sovereign boundaries is a process with
which the EU continues to grapple with when it comes to administering legal solidarity
on immigration. Immigration is and will mostly likely remain a divisive topic both
domestically and internationally, which has depended the north-south, east-west, and leftright divides across the EU.
Less contested is the ability of the EU to dictate policy on its member nations
over religious freedoms, as unanimously supported by all member states are the human
rights of religious freedom, thought, and conscience. However, Hungary again is an
outlier to aspects of religious policy as exemplified by the restrictive move to tighten
government controls of church status recipient religions via the 2011 ‘Church Law’.
Though this law as well as laïcité legality and practices in France do not break any EU
mandated treaties or human rights enough for intervention, both nations and especially
the Hungarian laws are reflective of pervasive, undermining currents through which
member-states reflect their disapproval of top-down command via domestic laws on
immigration and religion as they are viewed as infringing upon the sovereignty of the
native populations. While policy and legal norms of the European Union maintain their
international and superior status to that of domestic state level law, there are certain
sections in their policies which are held in higher validity and regard than others.
The immigration practices of France and Hungary vary more significantly than
inter-EU policy norms do. Though the conditions and treatments which asylum seekers
face at borders, in detention centers, and in slum settlements of both nations are
substandard, the largest inhibitors of effective immigration practice in the EU lies in the
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bureaucratic processes. Policies aimed at retention of business and ‘talented’
professionals maintain priority in new laws, as the immigration strategy of both the EU
and its member states is aimed at retention of high-credential individuals. This economic
priority comes at the cost of processes to better practice for asylum seekers’ attainment of
visas and residence permits being inhibited or remaining unchanged. While the EU,
France, and Hungary all desire immigrants for specific purposes, it is not necessarily a
desire to attract refugees, low credential workers, or asylum seekers to their state to offer
better quality of life. This is reflected in new laws, old traditions, and the level of
accessibility of the different types of immigration and residence visas depending on
immigration status.
The lack of timeliness of application response in Hungary has led to extensive
stays at transit zones while waiting to hear asylum cases. As anti-immigration remains a
dominant propaganda platform for PM Viktor Orbán, the results of this are reflected in
the all-time high of xenophobia among Hungarians, reaching 53% in 2016 (Simonovits et
al., 2016, p.42). Similar happenings have been occurring with the process delays in
France at the CADA and other asylum housing scheme sites or informal settlements.
Further contributing to less than ideal immigration practice for asylum seekers has been
the political biases in pro versus anti-immigration stances. Due to such large portions of
the populations of the member-states disapproving of the EU handling of the immigration
crisis, the ability of local governments to maintain their domestic practice preferences on
immigration has been bolstered by the majority support for domestically set norms.
Generalizations about religious groupings are often inaccurate and do not reflect
larger influences which actually shape the sociotropic perceptions of the majority
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Christian population of the EU; however, the perception remains clearly aligned to a
negative views of Muslim immigrants. The dominance of increasingly secular
Christianity over Europe for nearly two millennia has allowed for to its use as cultural
signal which many Europeans can identify with. Due to this, far-right populist political
groups in France and Hungary have used Christianity as a value signal of traditionalism
and xenophobia to attract the nativist populations.
Religion is further being propagandized as a dividing mark to display allegedly
inherent differences between the civilization of Christian European and the threat posed
by the Islamic civilization. The exploitation of archaic religious cleavages as a tool of
populist right-wing parties has increased the use of rhetoric about socio and
ethnoreligious differences between Christians and Muslims being valid reasons to support
Islamophobic actions. While this is not a majority sentiment in France, secular religion as
a culturally divisive marker is the most frequently utilized form of anti-immigration
framing. In Hungary, larger portions of the population already prescribe to Orbán led
misconceptions about white Christians being the rightful population of Europe. With
France continuing to have the largest population of Muslims in the EU,16 and the Muslim
population continuing to grow even if net migration could be zero for the next decade,
far-right politicians cannot simply close borders and expect the population of over 25
million EU Muslims to disappear (Hackett, 2017b).
An essential character to the recent state of immigration and religion has been the
role of populist parties and leaders from the far right. Exemplified by the Rassemblement
National and Marine Le Pen in France as well as Fidesz lead by Orbán in Hungary, these

16

Except for Bulgaria which is 11.1% Muslim, and not part of the Schengen Area or Eurozone portions of
the EU.
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parties increase the salience of anti-immigration desires of portions of the national
populations which prescribe to a highly traditionalistic views of who has the right to be in
their nation. Such far-right parties are the unifying measure of xenophobicly founded
sentiments and policy priorities which prioritize the culminated identities of far-right
populist’s heartland supporter as firmly against: immigrants, non-secular religions
(specifically non-Christian religion in the case of Hungary), and therefore Islam and its
followers. While these parties take different approaches in how they spread their
messages, such as liberalism being a unifying value in the rhetoric of the RN whereas it is
rejected by Fidesz, the modes of the rightist populist movements have been marked in
both nations by civilizationist, nativist, and religious cleavages drawn between the
supporter of “‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’,” (Mudde, 2004, p.543). By
providing high salience to this sociopolitical mindset, populist parties and leaders in both
France and Hungary have bolstered the anti-immigration movement with special force
since the institutional frenzy around Islam began in the west.
As in many other parts of the world, the rejection of immigrants is rooted in the
fear of heterogeneity across society. This causes the beneficial nature of practice of
immigration, especially the western world which is grappling with aging populations,
decreasing birth rates, and reduction of willingness to partake in low-wage or lowcredential labor, to be lost in the prevailing rhetoric of immigrant discrimination. With
demographic growth no longer being a realty for the native populations of France and
Hungary (“Populations Age 65 and Above (% of total)”; Banerji & Betcherman),
immigrants who decrease the overall age of the population, attend universities, and
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participate productively in the economy via employment and taxes, are a long-term
answer to the woes of such demographic stagnation across sectors.
This gap between immigrant and native populations is exemplified by economic
indicator statistics. In Hungary, foreign born unemployment is lower than native born
unemployment, at 3.4% and 4.2% respectively, with a greater labor force participation
from immigrants to Hungary by more than 6%, yet declines in gross domestic product
and population are predicted (OECD, 2017, and OECD, 2018b). Perhaps increasing the
evidently productive immigrant population in Hungary would benefit their economic and
demographic stagnation. For France, the overall trend of declining GDP is congruent to
that of Hungary, however population is rising and the foreign born population of France
does have higher unemployment and lower participation rates than the native born
population (OECD, 2018a).
Important to the population growth in France is that average immigrant age is 36
as opposed to the national median age of 41 (United Nations, 2017, p.29, and CIA, 2018),
and though native and foreign born women have children at roughly the same rate, the
number of children with at least one foreign born parent is rising (OECD/European
Union, 2015). For France and Hungary this means a less white, less Christian, and more
diverse population will increasingly become the norm, and this is where the oppositional
messages of right-wing nationalists take root and reject any positive influence immigrant
populations bring. When regarding increasing religious diversity brought about by
immigration in the traditionally uniform religious demography of Europe, the already
secularized Christian churches feel their position is further weakened and threaten by the
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social, ethnic, and allegedly moral differences, even from a religion such as Islam which
is part of the same Abrahamic family of Christianity and Judaism.
In a speculative view on the future on immigration policy across the European
Union, the topic will remain in its status of divisive and highly salient. Without some
form of policy change at the international level, member-states will remain dissatisfied
with the EU level policies and move increasingly towards a return of their sovereign
preferences on immigration, though this may not be as restrictive a turn in France as it
will likely continue to be in Hungary. As decreasing immigration or decreasing
heterogeneity is not a reflection of reality without an authoritarian turn right in political
dominance, the norm of an increasingly multicultural society will hopefully be met with
the continuation of equality, acceptance, and effective integration among national
populations. Additionally, with populist parties from the far right continuing in their
mainstreamness throughout the European Union, the voices of nationalism, nativism,
Christianism, and Islamophobia will not be going away anytime soon. As the prominence
of populist rightists exemplified by “Orbán's success [which] has inspired and
emboldened many other right-wing populists in the EU… [such as] Marine Le Pen in
France” (Mudde, 2016) continue on their policy crusade against immigrants, refugees,
asylum seekers, and Islam in particular, other sects of society will need to rise to the
occasion to protect human rights and freedoms, as illiberalism is a reality, but may not be
the threat to liberal policy hegemony that some scholars make them out to be.
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UPDATE ON THE CURRENT SITUATION

For Emanuel Macron, his pro-immigration stance is continuing to be strained and
rejected by oppositional factions from inside France and the European Union. To start the
year, Marine Le Pen announced far-right selectees for the European Parliament elections
coming in May of 2019, and is hopeful to win the French people’s support as Macron has
becoming increasingly unpopular during the end period of 2018 due to the gilets jaunes
protests (Vinocur, 2019). This comes as the question of the migration quota scheme from
the EU has regained public attention in the Le grand débat national17 public meetings and
surveys set up in response to the gilets jaunes, with direct questioning about the issues of
immigration and integration in separate concluding section (République Fraçaise , 2018,
p.11-12). This productive and democratic approach to the issue of immigration and other
contested topics will hopefully yield beneficial results when the public debate results are
synthesized and published in April of 2019 (Le grand débat national, 2018). While
immigration remains contested, good news had stemmed from integration projects in
France, with the UNHCR highlighting one French town’s success in particular, that of
Pessat-Villeneuve and their Nigerian and Chadian refugee population (Schmitt & LebasJoly, 2019). This is a story of acceptance, resettlement, successful socio-cultural
integration, and relief for the African refugees who now find this French town to be their
home. For the current status of immigration in France, less news seems to be a positive
development as negative scenarios have unfolded to start 2019 in Hungary.

17

Official site of Le grand débat national (in French):
https://granddebat.fr/media/default/0001/01/8bbebb4269cf29d6e96ba4dc52dd0450116661c3.pdf
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While Viktor Orbán may agree with Macron’s proposition that the EU needs to
have serious debates about immigration (Dunai & Peto, 2019), he certainly doesn’t
support the pro-immigration stance of the French president (Schaart, 2019);
“[Hungarians] don’t see these people as Muslim refugees. We see them as Muslim
invaders,” (Barry, 2019). Though Viktor Orbán said this to a German news outlet in
2018, his messages, propaganda, and Islamophobic anti-immigration platform has
experienced no change of heart, expect perhaps that of a hardening of this oppositional
stance to Muslim immigrants.
In late March of this year, the cross continental center-right European Peoples’
Party went so far as to suspend Fidesz’s membership based on Orbán and his comrades’
recent actions and public sentiments which include alleged censorship and a variety of
ethnoreligious racisms (Baume & Bayer, 2019). This decision came as the European
Court of Human Rights had to intervene for the eighth time to condemn the practices of
the Hungarian Government in the Röszke transit zone for starving those who were
detained as asylum seekers (Than, 2018; Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2019). When
the ECHR Council Commissioner, Dunja Mijatović, made a five-day country visit this
year, she noted a variety of concerns in Hungary, touching on “human rights challenges”
ranging from gender inequalities, refugee rights and protections failures, and systematic
xenophobia in government practice and rhetoric (Commissioner for Human Rights,
2019b).
Additionally, the ‘Stop Soros’ legislative package, which criminalizes those who
help asylum seekers, was officially approved by the Hungarian Constitutional Court,
though those who “selflessly assist” will not be penalized (Hungarian Helsinki
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Committee, 2019a). The judicial system of Hungary is under scrutiny for being politically
biased, especially since the late 2018 approval by the Hungarian Parliament of a parallel
court system to the current judicial sector which will allow for executive control of
judicial seat selection, as well as place all “public affairs” matters including “electoral
law, corruption and the right to protest” within this new system’s jurisdiction (Novak &
Kingsley, 2018). Thus, this constitutional decision is an unsurprising result as it is
entirely in line with the disinformation narrative of Fidesz and Orbán as the party
continues to tighten its control over the nation. Evidently, policy practice and sentiment
have experienced no turn away from the populist, far-right in Hungary.
Finally, it is within the continued rising backdrop of nationalism, nativism, and
far-rightism that the Islamophobically motivated massacre of 50 Muslims at two mosques
was committed on March 15th in New Zealand. These people were targeted for their
religious identity, with the perpetrator referencing Norwegian Anders Breivik as a source
of inspiration for this heinous act of far-right terrorism; both men acted against a
perceived “Muslim invasion” (Ravndal, 2019). Though anti-immigration sentiments and
the existence of far-right populists are in no way the key contributing factors in
motivating terroristic acts against Muslims (Ravndal, 2019), it is important to remember
that tolerance of social hatreds as acceptable norms anywhere is no way forward in the
hope of peaceful coexistence for all ethnoreligious groups.
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